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ELECTIVE STERILIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire for family planning has become a prevalent and widely
accepted attitude in American marriage. Sterilization is a surgical pro-
cedure which offers a married couple a permanent means of limiting their
family to its present size. However, it has significant moral and religious
overtones for many members of the community, and the law in most
jurisdictions has not provided the medical profession with any standards
for a legally acceptable sterilization policy. The first half of this Note is
the product of field research among doctors and hospitals in the Phila-
delphia area to discover whether sterilization is readily available for the
purpose of family limitation and upon what grounds doctors tend to restrict
its use for this purpose.' The second half of the Note analyzes the legal
consequences of elective sterilization-a significant concern of many of the
doctors interviewed-and suggests legislation which would relieve the
medical profession of any inhibiting doubts as to the controlling legal
standards.
The purpose of the field research project was not to obtain a complete
statistical survey of sterilization practices, but rather to discover the
prevalent attitudes of the medical profession by selective investigation.
The method of field research consisted of interviews with thirteen obste-
tricians or gynecologists and six urologists, who were all hospital staff
members or chiefs of service, of their respective departments. 2 Since most
of the doctors were affiliated with at least two hospitals, the survey
represents an extensive cross-sampling of the larger metropolitan and
suburban hospitals.3 Information about female sterilization in six addi-
I The Review wishes to express its appreciation to the Thomas Skelton Harrison
Foundation for allocating funds so that an interview method of research could be
employed in this study.
2 Because of the sensitive nature of this subject, none of the doctors or hospitals
interviewed would permit their opinions or factual information about their steriliza-
tion practice to be made a matter of public record. The Review will keep the notes
of the interviews and all correspondence of the research project on file and endeavor
to obtain the consent of the parties interviewed to make this information available
for further research in this area.
3 No interviews were conducted with staff members of Catholic hospitals be-
cause preliminary inquiries revealed that these hospitals would not permit steriliza-
tions of convenience. Compare text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
There are sixteen non-Catholic hospitals with over two hundred beds in the
Philadelphia area, and the doctors interviewed included staff members of thirteen of
these hospitals. Most of the doctors were also affiliated with smaller hospitals and
familiar with their sterilization policies.
Because vasectomy is usually an office procedure, each individual physician may
determine his own standards for performing elective sterilization. For this reason
a broadly representative sample of vasectomy practice would have necessitated a
greater number of interviews than the resources of the research project permitted.
However, the urologists interviewed indicated that their attitudes and practices
reflected the approach of most of the Philadelphia urologists.
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tional hospitals and about the private practice of one urologist was obtained
through written responses to mailed inquiries.
When used in this Note, "elective" sterilization or "sterilization of
convenience" designates surgical sterilization performed for the purpose
of family limitation motivated solely by personal or socio-economic con-
siderations. "Therapeutic" sterilization, on the other hand, is employed
to protect the physical 4 or mental health 5 of the patient. "Voluntary"
sterilization, performed with the consent of the patient, is used to dis-
tinguish the elective and therapeutic procedures from those operations
performed pursuant to state statutes providing for compulsory eugenic
sterilization of mental defectives and habitual criminals.
A. A Description of the Surgical Procedures
In female sterilization, called salpingectomy or tubal ligation, the
abdominal cavity is opened and the fallopian tubes are cut and tied to prevent
the uniting of sperm and egg. The operation requires general anesthesia
and is generally designated as major surgery. Hospitalization is always
required, but when a tubal ligation is done post partum, after delivery,
a woman's hospital confinement is not appreciably lengthened. Moreover
the post partum operation is simplified by the fact that the swollen uterus
presses the fallopian tubes closer to the abdominal wall, thus requiring a
smaller incision. In either case there is some risk of death as an
immediate result of the operation.6
Male sterilization, vasectomy, is a simpler procedure which may
be performed in the physician's office under local anesthesia. The vas
deferens, the tube connecting the testes with the urinary canal, is severed
and tied, preventing the sperm from thereafter passing into the urinary
canal. However, for a short time after the operation sperm may still be
ejaculated because the ejaculate will still contain sperm present from before
the operation. The doctor should advise the patient to return for several
weeks after the operation, until it is certain that no sperm remain. There
may be some discomfort or a possibility of slight infection following the
4 Medically indicated sterilization covers a wide range of possibilities. The doc-
tors interviewed suggested three general categories: (1) diseases which would make
pregnancy dangerous to the life or health of the mother, such as severe cardiac or
kidney disorders; (2) diseases of a congenital or hereditary nature that make it
probable that pregnancy will result in deformed or stillborn children; and (3) severe
grand multiparity which increases the probabilities of complications with future
pregnancies. There is no uniformity of opinion on whether this last factor should
always constitute a medical indication for sterilization. However, doctors usually
recommend sterilization after thr~e caesarean sections if it is likely that the woman
would not be able to have natural deliveries in the future.
5Compare note 21 infra and accompanying text.
6There was some disagreement among the doctors interviewed as to the seri-
ousness of the risk to the patient. Some doctors reported that the danger of mor-
tality was about one per thousand. However, other doctors indicated their belief
that it was substantially lower.
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operation, but usually the patient is not inconvenienced for more than a
few days.
The permanence of surgical sterilizations is qualified by the possibility
either of recanalization or a surgical reversal of the operation. Recanali-
zation, which is more common in the case of vasectomy, occurs when the
cut tubes grow together to permit the passage of sperm or egg. Due to
the use of improved surgical techniques, this possibility has been greatly
reduced. Surgical reversal is a difficult operation and is only successful
in a small percentage of cases. Therefore, a patient contemplating under-
going the operation must consider it as a permanent, irreversible procedure.
II. THE ELECTIVE STERILIZATION PROBLEm
A. Individual Motives for Elective Sterlization
In view of the reasonably effective contraceptive devices presently
available, it would seem unlikely that many people would undergo elective
sterilization. However, recent studies on the effectiveness of contraceptive
methods indicate that these devices do not completely eliminate the risk
of accidental pregnancy. In one group composed of 5,788 couples who
used several different methods of contraception, there were 1,437 accidental
pregnancies.7 Experts in the area of family planning suggest that the lack
of complete success in the use of contraceptives is caused not by any
technical failure of the devices, but rather by the individual couple's in-
ability to employ them properly and consistently-primarily because of
the inconvenience accompanying their use.8 Although contraceptive pills
are not subject to this objection, they may produce side effects of nausea
and vomiting, and they are as yet so new that many women are afraid to
use them.9
7 FREADMAN, WHELPTON & CAMPBELL, FA&Immy PLANNING, STERILITY AND POPU-
LATION Gowrn 421 (1959).
In a compilation of studies on the rate of pregnancies of women using the
diaphragm and jelly methods, the average pregnancy rate in fourteen reported
studies was about 14%. Agarwala, Population Control in India: Progress and
Prospects, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 577, 590 (1960).
8 General acceptance of the two contraceptive methods given greatest medical
approval, diaphragm and condom, is severely handicapped by complexity of
the former, and the necessity to make adjustment of the latter coincide with
the coital act. . . . (A] high degree of motivation is required to use either
method consistently for a long period, a degree of motivation a large pro-
portion of patients lack.
Guttmacher, The Influence of Fertility Control Upon Psychiatric Illness, 115 AmERI-
CAN J. PSYCHIATRY 683 (1959).
In a recent study of vasectomy, fear of contraceptive failure and contraceptive
interference with sexual pleasure were major reasons for seeking sterilization. Poffen-
berger & Poffenberger, Vasectomy as a Preferred Method of Birth Control: A
Preliminary Investigation, 25 MARRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING 326, 327 (1963).
9 The intrauterine coil, a new device which was being used experimentally by a
few doctors interviewed, can be removed by a doctor when pregnancy is desired
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On the other hand, in almost all cases surgical sterilization completely
eliminates the risk of unwanted pregnancy and the inconvenience of con-
traceptive devices. However, there are several considerations which may
inhibit an individual from choosing sterilization as a means of family
planning. Some individuals may be reluctant to accept the risk and dis-
comfort of the operation. Religious and moral attitudes, especially among
Catholics, may also preclude elective sterilization. A more universally
considered disadvantage of sterilization is the fact that it is almost always
an irrevocable procedure. Thus many couples may feel that the loss of
the ability to have children when they might be desired in the future is
not compensated for by the elimination of the fear of presently unwanted
pregnancies. Finally, some individuals, especially males, may reject
sterilization because of the fear, perhaps unfounded, of an adverse psycho-
logical effect from the inability to reproduce. 10
By weighing these competing considerations, a married couple may
rationally decide upon sterilization if they feel that the risks inherent in
the procedure are of lesser importance than the goal of effective family
limitation. However, in some instances the decision to be sterilized may
be made on the basis of transitory or irrational motives without adequate
consideration of the future consequences of the operation. The most
common illustration of this situation is where one of the parties seeks
sterilization as a means to arrest the effects of an unhappy marriage or to
punish an offending spouse. Similarly, sterilization may be decided upon
after the birth of a retarded or deformed child although prognosis indicates
that future births would probably be normal. Temporary emotional diffi-
culties unrelated to marital problems may also cause a hastily considered
decision to be sterilized.1
and may make sterilization obsolete once it is perfected. However, the medical
profession is still unsure of the reason for its effectiveness and whether it may have
any reaction on internal body tissue. Moreover, if the effectiveness of the coil is due
to the fact that it produces an abortion of a fertilized ovum, rather than simply pre-
venting fertilization of the ovum, it may incur the serious objection of both the
Catholic and Protestant religions. See Medical World News, Nov. 6, 1964, pp. 110-11.
And it might be held to be a device for procuring an abortion within the terms of
many abortion statutes.
10 However, the most extensive study on the sexual and psychological effects of
sterilization indicates that it produced exhilarating or at least no depressive effects
on sexual activities in about 95% of the cases studied. Koya, Sterilization in Japan,
8 EUGENICS Q. 135, 139 (1961).
Of 235 women sterilized in Stockholm in 1951, 54% reported no change in
capacity for sexual satisfaction, 33% improved and 13% reduced. 2 EXCERPTA
CPimiNoLoGIcA 735, 736 (1962).
For further studies dealing with motivation and results of vasectomies, see
generally Poffenberger & Poffenberger, stepra note 8, at 326; Rodgers, Ziegler,
Rohn & Prentiss, Sociopsychological Characteristics of Patients Obtaining Vasecto-
inies from Urologists, 25 MARRIAGE & FAmILY LIVING 331 (1963).
11 Finally, an even more difficult motive to detect may be a desire for sterilization
to gratify a wish for self-mutilation or self-destruction. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST
HImsELF 308-11 (1938).
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B. Present Medical Practice
1. Female Sterilization: Tubal Ligation
In many areas of hospital practice, the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals 12 promulgates certain procedural and substantive rules
which a hospital must follow if it wishes to be accredited.1 In December
1961 the commission responded to several inquiries from member hospitals
on the proper procedure to be followed for sterilization operations and
issued a bulletin on this subject.'4 The commission did not attempt to
establish substantive criteria to be applied to requests for sterilizations.
However, they did decide that certain minimal procedures should be
followed "for the protection of the patient, hospital, and physician." 15
The commission requires that each hospital set and enforce its own sub-
stantive rules, with the approval of the governing board of the hospital
and its legal counsel. Moreover, the hospitals' rules must conform to
applicable state law and contain a requirement that another doctor be
consulted before the operation is performed.' 6
Despite the freedom from regulation by the commission and the
absence of Pennsylvania statutes on the subject, obstetricians and gyne-
cologists in the Philadelphia area have established rules for their hospitals
which greatly restrict the number of elective sterilizations. Three of the
eighteen hospitals investigated will not perform sterilizations of conven-
ience; they require a showing of medical necessity to justify the operation.
In one of these hospitals, the committee which passes upon every applica-
tion for sterilization often strains to find a therapeutic indication when
there are already several children in the family. Where voluntary steriliza-
tions are permitted, most hospitals have required that a woman have
either conceived (gravity) or delivered (parity) a certain number of
children at the time the operation is performed. 17 Age, too, is a deter-
minative factor; there is much more hesitancy to sterilize a younger
woman, regardless of the number of children she has.
12The commission's member organizations are the American College of Physi-
cians, American College of Surgeons, American Hospital Association, and American
Medical Association.
13The commission enforces its rules by periodic inspection of the hospitals and
their records and disaccreditation of those hospitals that do not comply. Several
of the hospital staff members interviewed said that the particular interest in steril-
ization records by the commission's investigators made them fear an adverse reaction
by the commission if they performed "too many" sterilizations.
14Bulletin From Kenneth B. Babcock, M.D., Director of the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals, No. 28, Dec. 1961.
Is Ibid.
16Ibid.
17 The requirement that a certain number had been delivered or conceived seems
to show more concern for the health of the mother, because after a certain number
of conceptions or deliveries, future pregnancies become more complicated. A rule
which requires that there be a certain number of living children reflects a greater
concern for the possibility that a woman will change her mind or circumstances so
that she desires additional children.
420 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In order to accommodate both of these considerations, some hospitals
have established age/parity formulae based upon the standards promulgated
by Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. Under this formula a tubal
ligation will be done at the request of a couple that has six living children.
However, the required number is varied with reference to the age of the
patient. If a woman is thirty to thirty-five years old with 5 living children,
or over thirty-five with four living children, a sterilization can be ob-
tained.' 8
The hospitals in Philadelphia generally apply more liberal standards.
Only one hospital requires six living children. Four of the eighteen
hospitals investigated require five living children, regardless of the age of
the patient. One hospital requires five deliveries, another only five preg-
nancies. The other hospitals' standards are generally variations on the
Mount Sinai model. One example of such a formula is: twenty-five years
old, five living children; thirty years old, four living children; thirty-five
years old, three living children.' 9 The most liberal standard is three
living children without any fixed-age requirement. However, a patient
with this number of children is not automatically able to obtain a steriliza-
tion because the doctor must consult with another physician and exercise
his discretion with reference to such factors as the age, mental and physical
health, and financial position of the applicant. One hospital will sterilize
any woman over forty years of age.
Most of the hospitals in Philadelphia employ a combination of proce-
dures to review applications for sterilizations. When the standard is
based upon an age/parity formula, permission to perform the operation is
automatic, or consultation with another physician in the hospital's depart-
ment of obstetrics and gynecology is required. The requirement of a con-
sultation seems superfluous when the standard does not demand a doctor's
discretion. But it probably is maintained to meet the commission on
accreditation's standards. If there is a medical indication for sterilization,
a consultation with at least one staff member who specializes in the
disorder is usually required. Sometimes a committee passes upon every
application, or at least those applications that do not comply with the
accepted standards for that hospital.
2. Male Sterilization: Vasectomy
Two serious medical objections to female sterilization, the use of
general anesthesia and the opening of the abdominal cavity, are not present
in male sterilization. Since the cutting and tying back of the vas
deferens can be done under local anesthesia in the doctor's office, male
18 Guttmacher, The Influence of Fertility Control Upon Psychiatric Illness, 116
AmERICAN J. PSYCHrATRY 683, 685 (1959).
19 Another hospital's standards require four living children at age thirty-five,
five living children at age thirty-two, and six living children at age twenty-five.
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sterilization generally is not regulated either by the hospitals or their
departments of urology to the same extent as female sterilization. Several
institutions require consultation with one or more doctors before the
operation may be performed in the hospital, but usually it is up to the
individual doctor to decide whether or not a sterilization is justified. In
spite of the ease of the operation and the discretion in the individual
doctor, the interviews suggested that urologists have imposed even more
severe substantive restrictions on vasectomy operations than are present
in female sterilization.
Five out of seven urologists interviewed reported that they will only
perform sterilizations when therapeutic indications exist. Another doctor
said he would relax the requirement of medical justification in cases of
severe economic hardship, but suggested that in the past these exceptions
have been very rare. Only one doctor said that he performed vasectomies
on the basis of the number of children a couple had. He would sterilize a
man, upon request, if he had three living children. However, this is not
his sole criterion because he excludes Catholics, who may have adverse
psychological reactions, and those applicants whom he feels are emotionally
unstable. This doctor and the other members of the staff of the depart-
ment of urology of the hospital with which he is affiliated do not perform
vasectomies of convenience in the hospital because of the elaborate proce-
dure that must be followed there.
Since it appears that most urologists will not perform sterilizations of
convenience, the possible range of justifications for a vasectomy are quite
limited. Medical necessity, such as repeated swollen epididymis, is the
most frequent occasion for the operation. Usually no consultation or any
other procedure is required. As an elective procedure, sterilization is
performed by most doctors only in the case of an hereditary disease.
However, some doctors will perform a vasectomy if requested by the
family doctor or the wife's obstetrician in cases where it would be medically
harmful for the wife to become pregnant and too dangerous for her to
undergo surgery for the purpose of sterilization.
C. The Inhibiting Factors
The primary emphasis of the field research interviews was placed on
the reasons by which doctors justify the imposition of restrictive standards
on elective sterilization. Many of the considerations which may dissuade
an individual from undergoing sterilization were also suggested as justifi-
cations for a restrictive policy. Each doctor interviewed was primarily
concerned with the permanent nature of the operation and the possibility
that something might happen to one or more of the couple's children or
that the party to be sterilized might remarry and desire children by the
second spouse.
Another important consideration, which significantly affects the prac-
tice in female sterilization, is the possibility of mishap during surgery.
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Since the procedure is purely elective, doctors do not like to take even a
small chance with the patient's life, especially in view of the availability of
other reasonably effective contraceptive methods.
Finally, some doctors considered the possibility that vasectomy may
produce adverse psychological reactions, such as diminution of pleasure
in the sexual act or even functional impotence.20
In addition to these reasons, however, the interviews revealed several
other factors which influenced some doctors to avoid sterilizations of
convenience entirely or severely to limit their availability.
1. Loss of Reputation
The fear of community disapproval of a liberal sterilization practice
may be a major reason for adopting a restrictive policy. Individual
doctors and hospital staff chiefs evidenced a great concern for the possible
loss of reputation in the community and in the profession which such
disapproval, whether privately held or publicly expressed, may produce.
They suggested that the loss of reputation may result in loss of patients
and endowments and possible restrictions by the legislature. Two primary
sources of community condemnation were indicated.
a. Sterilization and Abortion
When asked about sterilization, doctors would invariably bring up
the subject of abortion, and it seems that the legal and moral prohibitions
against abortion affect their attitudes towards sterilization. One doctor
felt that this close identification of abortion with sterilization is one of the
major reasons why the medical profession has restricted the availability of
sterilizations. Moreover, the common association of the two problems
has led hospitals to establish similar procedures for passing upon applica-
tions for sterilizations and therapeutic abortions.
However, the doctors recognized that sterilization can be distinguished
from abortion by the attitude which the law has adopted toward the two
procedures. In thirty-one states a doctor may perform an abortion only
when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. On the other
hand, sterilization, except for institutionalized persons, is generally not
restricted by statute. Moreover, the medical profession seems to have
distinguished between the cogency of the moral arguments against steriliza-
tion and abortion. Many doctors felt that abortion is as serious a public
offense as murder, or that it is at least contrary to the purpose of the
2 oAlthough there is relatively little evidence to support the validity of this belief,
see note 10 supra, it might be desirable for the doctors to refer certain applicants
to a psychiatrist for his advice on whether the operation should be performed. This
procedure would probably reveal the more severe psychological cases, and it would
eliminate the need for an overly restrictive policy to compensate for this possibility.
The one doctor interviewed who has had extensive experience with vasectomy said
that he has never had a case result in severe psychological disturbance. However,
he is careful to investigate the psychological attitude of his applicants and to refuse
the operations to those whom he thinks would be subject to such a severe reaction.
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practice of medicine because it takes away a life. Even though doctors
have imposed restrictions on sterilization, most doctors interviewed did
not view sterilization under certain conditions as morally wrong. These
factors suggest that a primary reason that doctors associate sterilization
with abortion is the fear that the public regards them with the same dis-
approval.
The practice of recommending or even requiring that a woman be
sterilized in some cases when a therapeutic abortion is performed indicates
that doctors are willing to perform sterilizations where they feel that public
opinion would not be unfavorable. This practice is reasonable when the
therapeutic justification for the abortion indicates that the woman's life
would be endangered by future pregnancies, because doctors do not want
to be forced to perform repeated abortions. However, it may be objection-
able when the indication for therapeutic abortion is an emotional disorder,
because psychiatric care could enable many women to withstand the
emotional strain of childbirth and parenthood."
In the above situations the much stronger condemnation of abortion
leads doctors to sterilize in cases where it is not requested and may not
even be desired.
A comparison between legal regulations and medical practice in the
fields of abortion and sterilization suggests that the medical profession
attempts to reflect a consensus of community values in its attitudes toward
controversial procedures. Although doctors recognize the legal and moral
restraints on abortion, they have felt that the law is unnecessarily restric-
tive in light of prevalent public opinion, and there is evidence that the
practice of therapeutic abortion is much broader than the law would seem
to permit.2 2 On the other hand, there are no statutory restrictions on
sterilization in most states, and most doctors do not have rigid ethical
objections to this procedure. However, doctors have invariably imposed
their own restrictive standards for the operation, which have substantially
reduced its availability.
b. Opposition by Religious Groups
Although some individuals may object to elective sterilization on
ethical or moral grounds, there appears to be no strong opposition among
Protestant23 or Jewish 24 theologians to contraception in general, nor
to sterilization in particular. According to present Catholic doctrine, how-
21 One psychiatrist has stated that the insistence that a sterilization accompany
a therapeutic abortion of a youthful patient must have certain punitive aspects,
because her psychiatric condition may improve greatly. Laidlow, Discussion, 115
AMERmcAN J. PSYCHrATRY 689, 690-91 (1959).
22 See generally Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law
and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417 (1959).
23See FAGLEY, THE POPULATION ExPLoSI N AND CHRIsTIAN REspoNsmrry
207, 221 (1960).
24 See generally Rachman, Morality in Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish
View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205, 1217 (1956).
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ever, sterilization is subject to the prohibition against artificial birth control
and is not permitted in Catholic hospitals unless sterility is induced as the
result of a necessary primary procedure. The Catholic Hospital Associa-
tion's Directive to Catholic Hospitals states:
Procedures that induce sterility, whether permanent or temporary, are
permitted when:
a) they are immediately directed to the cure, diminution or
prevention of a serious pathological condition;
b) a simpler treatment is not reasonably available; and
c) the sterility itself is an unintended and, in the circum-
stances, an unavoidable effect.
25
When asked about the hospital's sterilization practice, the administrator
of one Catholic hospital in Philadelphia responded that sterilization is
contrary to natural law and facilitates licentious living, undisciplined habits,
and venereal disease. Because sterilization involves a surgical interference
with natural bodily functions, a liberalization of Catholic doctrine on the
subject of birth control would probably not affect the attitude toward
sterilization.26 At present this attitude not only affects the practice in
Catholic hospitals, but has wide ramifications throughout the medical
profession as a whole. The large percentage of Catholics among the total
population has a significant effect on society's consensus as to the morality
of a sterilization operation. Several doctors interviewed stated that the
Catholic position was a definite inhibiting factor for individual practitioners,
including non-Catholics. Although the same Catholic prohibition on other
contraceptive devices does not affect most doctors, sterilization is dis-
tinguished because it may require major surgery and is usually irreparable.
The interviews suggested further restraints emanating from the
Catholic position which affect non-Catholic doctors and hospitals. Catholic
doctors on the staff of a hospital's obstetrics and gynecology department, or
on a committee which is required to approve every sterilization, usually
vote against a sterilization that would not meet the very strict requirements
applied in Catholic hospitals. Sometimes Catholic nurses or residents
refuse to aid a doctor performing a sterilization. Moreover, a reputation for
a lenient sterilization practice may jeopardize a hospital's relations with
nearby Catholic hospitals. Finally, doctors take into account the possibility
that Catholics may not go to an obstetrician or gynecologist who is con-
sidered to have unacceptably minimal standards for sterilizations.
2- CATHOLIC HOsPrTAL ASS'N OF THE U.S. AND CANADA, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DnzcrrvEs FOR CATHOLIC HOsPITALS (2d ed. 1959).26 There is some indication that it is because of the high rates of abortion and
sterilization in some countries that some Catholic clerics are willing to accept other
forms of family planning as a lesser evil. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 1, col. 3.
In Puerto Rico, despite the fact that 80% of the population is Catholic, steriliza-
tion has become one of the principal means of birth control. The demand for this
operation is increasing so rapidly that there are not enough facilities to meet it.
HILL, THE FAMILY AND POPULATION CONTROL 127 (1959).
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The public controversy concerning the passage of Virginia's voluntary
sterilization statute suggests that Catholic opposition to sterilization also
may be able to affect doctors and hospitals through the pressure of
organized public opinion. About five years ago the Facquier Hospital in
Warrenton, Virginia, began to operate a clinic which gave free medical
care for needy mothers-one of the services available being sterilization
for married mothers of three children. Approximately sixty women had
been sterilized in a two and one half year period.27 In 1962, persuaded
by the hospital staff at Facquier, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute
protecting doctors from liability for the nonnegligent performance of a
sterilization operation. About two months after the passage of the statute,
a Catholic Archbishop denounced sterilization as immoral, directing many
of his remarks at the Facquier Hospital. He said that sterilization "directly
violates a natural right which is so profoundly sacred that it may not be
taken away from the individual by the state and may not be voluntarily
surrendered to the state by the individual." 2 8 In the ensuing controversy
over sterilization, and in particular over the Virginia statute and the
Facquier Clinic, the hospital was plagued with reporters, and its steriliza-
tion policy was discussed in newspapers for over a month. Since they
have neither the time nor the desire to become involved in such a dispute,
few hospitals and doctors are willing to risk being subjected to this kind
of publicity.
2. Fear of Legal Liability
Almost all of the doctors interviewed expressed a fear of the possible
legal consequences to themselves and to their hospitals of performing
elective sterilizations. Among urologists this fear was a major factor in
restricting sterilizations of convenience; gynecologists and obstetricians
did not feel it was as significant a deterrent. In many cases this concern
was not well defined in legal terminology, but the general apprehension was
thought to inhibit a more liberal sterilization practice. Most of the doctors
interviewed did not think that they would be criminally prosecuted. In
Pennsylvania there is no statute either prohibiting or regulating steriliza-
tions, but a -few doctors suggested a possibility that the definitions of other
crimes, such as assault, may encompass the procedure. The fear of
becoming involved in a. civil action was not directed solely at the payment
of large damages or increases in insurance rates, because the loss of time,
inconvenience, and possible damage to reputation that may result induce
doctors not to perform elective sterilizations even if they feel they could
27 N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1962, p. 60, col. 4.
28 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 25, col. 2.
In reply to this attack, a Unitarian minister defended the Virginia law: "It is
not a moral evil but a moral good, for it grants to the poor privileges they desperately
need which are now enjoyed by the prosperous alone." N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1962,
p. 26, col. 5. A second Unitarian minister called for "enlightened legislation per-
mitting population control through the use of contraceptives, sterilization and thera-
peutic abortion." Ibid.
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successfully defend a suit. This attitude is intensified by the sharp rise
in malpractice suits, of which almost every doctor interviewed was aware.
Doctors and hospitals were primarily concerned with the possibility
of civil tort actions by the patient founded upon the theory that the opera-
tion was performed without his consent. They believed that the consent
which they always required before they would proceed may be held invalid,
because a court might find that the operation is against public policy. One
doctor suggested that the same public policy that underlies laws to prevent
criminal abortion applies to sterilizations, even though that policy had not
produced a statute specifically forbidding such operations. Another theory
on which the consent might be invalidated is that the patient did not fully
understand the serious and permanent consequences of the operation.
This claim would be particularly common in situations where the patient
had later become dissatisfied with the permanent results of the operation.
One urologist, who avoids sterilizations of convenience because he believes
the patient's consent will not be a valid defense, does not apply this
restriction to sterilizations of doctors, since he feels that a judge or jury
could never conclude that they did not fully understand the consequences
of the operation. In the area of female sterilization, the fear of liability
under this theory has been partially responsible for certain of the procedural
requirements, such as obtaining the consent of both spouses, the con-
currence of another doctor, or a committee's approval of each application.
In one hospital "the absence of a clearly defined legal code and the in-
adequacies of medical custom in the perplexity of therapeutic abortion and
sterilization necessitated the establishment of a Therapeutic Abortion-
Sterilization Committee to adjudicate these problems." 29 The fact that
other doctors, who are concerned with the same issues, have agreed that
a particular operation should be performed makes the surgeon more con-
fident in his decision that public policy would not be contravened by the
procedure. Although the substantive standards in the area of female
sterilization are primarily motivated by nonlegal considerations, there is
some feeling that while a sterilization performed on a woman with five
children would not be legally objectionable, a sterilization performed with-
out regard to the number of children or the age of the patient may be
declared to be contrary to public policy.
In the occasional cases in which male sterilization is performed in a
hospital, consultation with another doctor and consent of both spouses is
required. However, since the operation is almost always performed in
the doctor's office, there are no uniform consultation requirements. Only
one of the urologists interviewed was unconcerned with the possibility of
legal liability. He obtained the consent of the patient, but did not consult
with any other doctor. The other urology specialists were primarily
concerned with the legal consequences and felt that no procedures or
29 Savel & Perlmutter, Therapeutic Abortion and Sterilization Committee: A
3 Year Experience, 80 AmERicAN J. OsTERICS & GYNECOLOGY 1192 (1960).
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standards, except complete refusal to perform the operation, would ade-
quately protect them.
A second theory upon which a doctor's liability could be founded is
medical malpractice. Since the standard of reasonable care is generally
what other doctors in the community would do,30 consultation or committee
approval is evidence of what is "accepted medical practice." These pro-
cedures are particularly valuable where sterilization is recommended by
the physician after diagnosis of a therapeutic indication or where steriliza-
tion is restricted by state statute to cases in which there is a medical need
for the operation.
Under any theory of liability, the fear of legal consequences is more
troublesome to urologists because of the greater possibility of recanaliza-
tion and the fact that a successful operation would not preclude the wife's
pregnancy. A sterilized male whose wife becomes pregnant, whether as
a result of natural reversal, the doctor's negligence, or intercourse with
another man, might sue the operating physician. This greater likelihood
of dissatisfaction with the operation and the fear that the patient's consent
will not hold up in court have greatly limited the possibility of obtaining
a sterilization of convenience from a urologist in Philadelphia.
III. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ELEcTIVE STERILIZATION
A. Criminal Liability
Three states have enacted statutes declaring the performance or pro-
motion of salpingectomy or vasectomy a criminal offense unless performed
under the provisions of the compulsory eugenic statutes or by a private
physician where there is a "medical necessity." 3i One of these statutes
expressly extends the criminal liability to any person who knowingly
submits to the operation 3 2 The test of "medical necessity" applicable
under these statutes is a novel one in the criminal law. The only analogous
standards are those established by statutes prohibiting abortion except
when necessary to preserve the life33 or, under some statutes, the health
of the mother.3 4 It would seem that if the legislatures wished to limit
the availability of sterilization to the same extent, they would have em-
ployed the more definite language of the abortion statutes. Their failure
to do so indicates that the "medical necessity" test may allow doctors
30See Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (Wash. 1964). Compare text accom-
panying note 85 infra.
81 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. §53-33 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §76-155
(1949) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §64-10-12 (1961).
3 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-33 (1958).
33 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (abortion permissible "to preserve the life
of the mother").
3 4 See, e.g., COL. RV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1953) (abortion permissible to
prevent "serious and permanent bodily injury" to the mother).
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more discretion. Whether this test will prove broad enough to permit
voluntary sterilization for eugenic purposes or to protect the health of the
patient's spouse must be determined by judicial construction as the cases
arise.
With the exception of two other states which have granted doctors a
statutory immunity from criminal liability for elective sterilization done
under certain procedures,3 5 no state has legislation dealing specifically with
elective sterilization. In these states any criminal liability which might
result from performance of or submission to the operation must be found
in the general criminal provisions of the state. The only provisions which
seem reasonably applicable to elective sterilization are those dealing with
mayhem and assault.
At common law the crime of mayhem consisted of the unjustified
infliction of an injury which rendered the victim less able to fight for the
King, to defend himself, or to earn his own living.36 Since the prohibition
was established to protect the interest of the King, the consent of the
person maimed was no defense, and a soliciting or perhaps merely a
consenting victim was equally guilty of the offense.87  Since neither
vasectomy nor salpingectomy have any effect upon the physical capacity
of the patient beyond the inability to procreate, they would not constitute
mayhem at common law. However, the common-law definition has now
been superceded by modern statutes, which vary in the extent to which
they depart from the common law. The statutes extend the offense to
include disfigurement, and some prohibit disabling any member or organ.38
Moreover, the common law did not apply to women, but there is no doubt
that the modern statutes apply equally to either sex.39
Commentators have suggested that a court could find surgical sterili-
zation either legal or illegal under many statutes with equal propriety.40
While the language of many mayhem statutes could support a finding
that the operation constituted an offense, such a finding would seem to
ignore the historical purpose of the prohibition from which these statutes
evolved. Even if the statutes were read as prohibiting any injury which
would render the injured party a less effective member of society-as
broad a reading as any social interest would seem to require-sterilization
would not seem to fall within the prohibition.
3See text accompanying note 99 infra.
364 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES 205-06 (7th Oxford ed. 1775).
3 7 See 3 THoMAs, CoKE's FIRST INsTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 594-95
(1826) reporting Wright's Case, in which a young man procured a friend to cut
off his hand in order that he might better beg for a living. Both men were convicted
of mayhem.
3 8 See, e.g., OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 751 (1958); CAL. PEN. CODE § 203.
39 See Kitchens v. State, 80 Ga. 810, 7 S.E. 209 (1888).
40 Miller & Dean, Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.B.A.J.
158, 160 (1930) ; Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery,
14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 233, 277-78 (1942).
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While the requirement of most statutes that the injury be inflicted
with malice might be satisfied if it were inflicted purposely or with intent
to do the specific act,41 some modern statutory definitions of mayhem require
that the injury be inflicted by "lying in wait." 42 This requirement would
seem to limit the applicability of the statute to cases of aggravated assault,
and it is highly improbable that a surgical operation performed with the
consent of the patient could be found to constitute a violation of such a
statute.
Although the modern statutes defining mayhem often differ signifi-
cantly from the common law, the statutes dealing with assault and battery
are normally enactments of the common-law definition. Under this
definition the consent of the alleged victim is a defense to the charge unless
the act of the accused is otherwise unlawful.43 Where the act alleged as
constituting an assault is proscribed by law or is so clearly contrary to
the public health, safety, or morals that it may judicially be declared to
be against public policy, the victim's consent does not relieve the actor of
criminal liability.4 The sterilized patient is able to fulfill all his obligations
as a member of the community and lacks only the ability to procreate.
And since individuals and groups may differ as to whether this effect of
the operation is contrary to a paramount social interest, the courts would
not seem to be the proper forum to assess criminal liability solely on the
basis of their own interpretation of public policy.4 5 Moreover, the scrupu-
lous concern which the Philadelphia doctors evidence for the rights and
well-being of their patients in sterilization operations suggests that they
would not be the proper subjects for any criminal liability based upon a
potential threat to other members of the community.
41 See Henry v. State, 125 Ark. 237, 188 S.W. 539 (1916) (intent to do act
sufficient to establish malice) ; State v. Crawford, 13 N.C. 425, 428-29 (1830) (same).
Compare People v. Bryan, 190 Cal. App. 2d 781, 787 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961): "May-
hem includes an act plus a prerequisite state of ¢mind. . . . In mayhem, the actor
must have a state of mind characterized by the words unlawful and malicious.
Malice . . . imports an intent to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent
to do a wrongful act."
42 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4715 (1963).
43 See Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957).
44 See People v. Gibson, 232 N.Y. 458, 134 N.E. 531, 532 (1922).
45 The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public
policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems which are
controversial in nature and capable of solution only as the result of a study
of various factors and conditions. It is only when a given policy is so
obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that
there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may
constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. . . . If, in the
domain of economic and social controversies, a court were, under the guise
of the application of public policy, in effect to enact provisions which it might
consider expedient and desirable, such action would be nothing short of
judicial legislation, and each such court would be creating positive laws
according to the particular views and idiosyncracies of its members. Only
in the clearest cases, therefore, may a court make an alleged public policy
the basis of judicial decision.
Manlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941).
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B. Civil Liability
1. Civil Assault
In the absence of the patient's consent, any operation would constitute
a tortious invasion of his person for which the surgeon would be held
civilly liable, unless it had been performed as a medical necessity under
emergency conditions.46 Where the patient has consented to sterilization
with full understanding of the purpose and nature of the procedure, there
would be no tort 47 unless the operation were held to be unlawful in
itself, either under a specific statute limiting the permissible grounds for
the operation 48 or under the general criminal provisions. Assuming that
the operation is unlawful, the civil liability of the physician to a consenting
patient might be expected to follow the results which have obtained in
cases involving criminal abortion.49 In these cases the courts have divided
on the question whether the patient's consent bars a subsequent action.
The courts which have allowed recovery for tortious assault " have held
that the plaintiff's consent to an unlawful act cannot be legally effective,
perhaps upon the theory that the punitive and deterrent policies of the
criminal law ought to be supplemented by liability in civil actions.51 The
courts which have denied recovery have done so on the ground that the
4
G See, e.g., Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct App. 1952); Lacey v.
Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956) ; Foley, Consent as a Prerequisite to a
Surgical Operation, 14 U. CINC. L. REv. 161 (1940) ; Smith, supra note 40, at 234-48.
47 See PROSsER, TORTS § 18, at 82 (2d ed. 1955). Compare Ford v. Ford, 143
Mass. 577, 578, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (1887) (Holmes, J.): "[T]he absence of lawful
consent is a part of the definition of an assault"
48 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-33 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 76-155,
§ 155 (1949) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-12 (1961).
4) Abortion is the only other area of medical practice to which the criminal law
speaks specifically. Other operations, such as amputation of a limb, might be criminal
under the prohibitions of mayhem or unlawful wounding, if performed without medical
justification or at least for an unlawful purpose.
5 0 See, e.g., Pleak v. Cottingham, 94 Ind. App. 365, 178 N.E. 309 (1931) ; Joy v.
Brown, 173 Kan. 833, 252 P.2d 889 (1953); Millikin v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio
St 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924). But see Glovka v. Fortun, 29 Ohio App. 278, 163
N.E. 309 (1928) (dictum).
51 The theory stems from the early common law in which the actions of trespass
served primarily to bring breaches of the public peace within the jurisdiction of the
King's courts. The action was brought by the aggrieved party, who was induced
to act by the prospect of gain at the defendant's expense. However, a fine was
imposed in the King's name in the same suit, which thus served to vindicate both
the private interest and that of the Crown. Since vindication of the Crown's interest
depended upon suit by the injured party, the action could not be defeated by his
consent to the defendant's act. Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for
Breaches of the Peace, 24 CoLtJm. L. REV. 819, 825-27 (1924). Today, when the
interest of the state and that of the injured party are vindicated in separate criminal
and civil actions, there would seem to be little reason for importing the interest of
the state into the latter action. See id. at 829.
Courts in this country have divided upon the continuing applicability of the
"breach of the peace" doctrine. Compare Strawn v. Ingram, 118 W. Va. 603, 191
S.E. 401 (1937), with Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 294 Pac. 570 (1930). Never-
theless, a decreasing minority of courts has extended the doctrine by analogy to cases
of criminal abortion. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §60, illustration 4 (1934) for a
rejection of this position.
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plaintiff cannot base an action upon an unlawful act in which he par-
ticipated.
52
If elective sterilization is not prohibited by the criminal law, consent
would seem to be effective to render the operation nontortious with
respect to the patient.53 However, it has been suggested that the courts
may find that the consent is legally ineffective, not because the operation
is unlawful, but because sterilization is contrary to public policy.5r
Statutes limiting the availability of contraceptive drugs and devices have
been read as evidencing this public policy.55 However, these statutes are
often the product of an earlier era, and there is evidence that the author-
ities have not seen fit to enforce them in recent yearsYg6
Another statement of a public policy against nontherapeutic steriliza-
tion might be found in the saving clauses appended to some state eugenic
5 2 See, e.g., Hunter v. Wheate, 55 D.C. App. 206, 289 Fed. 604 (1923) ; Nash v.
Meyer, 54 Idaho 285, 31 P.2d 273 (1934) ; Castronovo v. Murawsky, 3 Ill. App. 2d
168, 120 N.E2d 871 (1954); Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N.E. 251
(1926); Miller v. Bennet, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949).
This theory has been employed to bar recovery either for assault or for negligent
performance of the operation. Cf. Andrews v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320
(1931) (recovery allowed for postoperative neglect, although no recovery could be
had for the performance of the abortion, whether or not negligent). RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 60 (1934) rejects this position as well as that allowing recovery for civil
assault It recognizes consent as a bar to recovery for assault while allowing recovery
for negligence on the theory that the plaintiff did not consent to negligent performance.
But see Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (Dist. Ct App.
1954), in which the court accepted the Restatement view on consent as a bar, but
deemed it unwise to attempt to establish standards of skill in cases of criminal
abortion.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §61 (1934) provides for recovery regardless of consent
where the legislative proscription of the act alleged was primarily intended to pro-
tect persons in plaintiff's position from their own indiscretion. Should the three
state statutes prohibiting elective sterilization be so construed, an operation in vio-
lation thereof might well result in liability even though the patient's consent was
obtained. The courts have divided on Whether the abortion statutes were enacted
to protect the patient or to protect the unborn child and society. See Paossm, TORTS
§ 18, at 87 (2d ed. 1955).
53 See note 47 supra.
54 See Smith, supra, note 40, at 278-79.
55 Ibid.; Miller & Dean, supra note 40, at 160.
Regulation of contraceptives assumes three basic forms: (1) total prohibition
of distribution and use, Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222
(1938); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. § 53-32 (1958); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21
(1956); (2) regulation of quality and means of distribution, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 2501-04 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-801 to -810 (1961) ; (3) prohibition
of public display and advertising, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2806 (1956) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 18, § 4525 (1963). The first form, in force in only two states, may well
be construed as establishing a public policy against any form of birth control. One
of.these states already has declared elective sterilization a criminal offense. CONN.
Ggx. STAT. REV. § 53-33 (1958). The second and third forms may at most seek
only to prevent contraceptives from contributing to promiscuity among youth. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §2503 (1953), which prohibits sale of contraceptives to
persons less than eighteen years of age. The permanence of surgical sterilization
renders it highly improbable that youths would resort to it for temporary safety,
even were they able to find a physician willing to perform the operation.
56 See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Terin,
75 HA.v. L. REv. 40, 60-61, 64 (1961).
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sterilization statutes.57 After prescribing the procedures and standards
by which the state may compel sterilization of mental defectives or
habitual offenders, these statutes provide that "nothing in this Act shall
be so construed as to prevent the medical or surgical treatment for sound
therapeutic reasons of any person in this state, by a physician or surgeon
licensed by this state, which treatment may incidentally involve the
nullification or destruction of the reproductive functions." 58 Although this
provision does not expressly proscribe surgical sterilizations done for
purposes other than those expressed in the statute, the fact that it negates
such a prohibition only in the case of sterilization incidental to therapeutic
treatment has been read as evincing a public policy against sterilization
absent such reasons.59 However, this line of reasoning raises several
problems of statutory construction. First, the fact that these provisions
appear in acts providing for administrative and judicial supervision of
compulsory sterilization operations upon mental defectives and habitual
criminals suggests that they are intended only to assure that the statutes do
not prevent or delay therapeutically necessary medical or surgical treatment
of these same persons. 60 Second, even if they may be read as intended
to apply to the general public, it is unlikely that the legislature fully con-
sidered, in this context, whether it would be in the public interest to impose
any restrictions upon elective sterilization. A failure expressly to sanction
nontherapeutic sterilization should not be interpreted, in the light of diverse
opinions on the subject within the community, as establishing an affirma-
tive policy against it.
If the state does not have a statute which could be construed as
establishing a public policy against nontherapeutic sterilization, the ultimate
question is whether the courts are competent to declare such a policy in
the absence of legislative action. Shaheen v. Knight,61 the only case which
has presented the opportunity for a judicial pronouncement of public
policy with respect to elective sterilization, arose in a lower Pennsylvania
court in the context of an action against a surgeon for breach of a contract
to sterilize the plaintiff. The defendant contended that a contract action
could not be maintained because such an agreement was in violation of
public policy. However, the court refused to hold that there was such a
policy against the operation on the ground that there was "no virtual
57See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174:12 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, § 346 (1954); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 32-679 (1962).
58 OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 346 (1954). The provisions of other statutes
differ only insignificantly in wording, except the Indiana provision which adds:
"Provided, that such treatment shall be that which is recognized as legal and ap-
proved after due process of law." IN . ANN. STAT. § 22-1606 (1964).
59 Compare note 55 supra.
60 The additional proviso of the Indiana statute, see note 58 mepra, would seem
to lend added weight to this analysis. Although the meaning of "approved after
due process of law" is certainly unclear in any context, its applicability to authorities
charged with the care of incompetents would appear more probable than any possible
applicability to private medical practice.
6111 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
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unanimity of opinion regarding sterilization." 02 In a similar context
in the case of Christensen v. Thornby,63 the Minnesota Supreme Court was
asked to find that public policy nullified a contract for the performance of
a vasectomy upon a man whose wife had been advised that pregnancy
would endanger her life. The court held that the operation was not
against public policy under these circumstances, but expressly reserved
the question of public policy as applied to sterilizations performed in the
absence of any therapeutic reason6
As a matter of sound judicial process, the reasoning of the Penn-
sylvania court seems correct. The function of the court is to recognize
and enforce values upon which there is a consensus in the community,
especially in cases involving the consensual relationships between private
parties. The resolution of conflicting views is within the particular
competency of the legislature.
2. Breach of Contract
In the three reported cases involving the liability of a physician
resulting from the performance of a nontherapeutic sterilization, 3 the
actions were based upon breach of contract to sterilize; plaintiffs sought
recovery because of a failure to sterilize successfully, rather than the
impropriety of the purpose of the operation. Even if the rationale of the
Shaheen case is accepted and a contract to perform a nontherapeutic
sterilization is found not to be against public policy, a plaintiff proceeding
under this theory still has the burden of establishing both a warranty that
the operation will be successful and compensable damages resulting from
its breach.
Although there is generally no implied "warranty of cure" in contracts
to perform surgical operations,"0 the doctor and patient are at liberty to
contract for a particular result.67 The likelihood of the existence of an
express agreement on the success of the operation is particularly great in
cases of nontherapeutic sterilization, because the patient requests the
operation for particular purposes and would reasonably demand some
assurance from the doctor that the procedure would accomplish these
ends. Moreover, the courts may be more willing to construe a doctor's
statements on the probable results of the operation as constituting a
62Id. at 43.
03 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
64 Id. at 125, 255 N.W. at 621.
05 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957);
Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) ; Ball v. Mudge, 391
P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964).
60 Goheen v. Graber, 181 Kan. 107, 112, 309 P.2d 636, 639 (1957) ; Grainger v.
Still, 187 Mo. 197, 213-14, 85 S.W. 1114, 1119 (1905); McCandless v. McWha, 22
Pa. 261 (1853); SHARTEL & PLANT, THE LAW oF M. nIcAL PRAcTIcE § 1-04, at 8
(1959).
67 See, e.g., Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Robins v.
Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
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promise that it will be successful because of the absence of a therapeutic
purpose. When there is a medical necessity, the patient has less reason
to conclude that the doctor's recommendation of an operation is a promise
that the disorder will be cured.
All of the reported cases deal with contracts to perform vasectomy
operations. Male sterilization poses more difficult problems for doctors in
subsequent breach-of-contract actions than does sterilization of the female,
because of the significantly greater possibility of natural reversal of the
operation, recanalization.6  Since doctors have not as yet been able to
preclude natural reversal, 69 plaintiffs may rely on this possibility to support
their allegations that they have fathered a child. In Ball v. Mudge,7
expert testimony was introduced on the plaintiff's high degree of fertility
before the operation to prove that recanalization had taken place.71  More-
over, sterilization of the male does not assure that a woman with whom
he has sexual relations will not become pregnant. If pregnancy does
occur, the patient may sue the doctor for failure of the operation. And
since there is a recognized possibility of recanalization, the doctor may
be placed in the difficult position of having to prove that the patient is
not the father.
72
Liability for breach of contract may easily be defeated if the physician
has sufficiently documented his understanding with the patient. All
doctors and hospitals interviewed required sterilization patients to sign
written consent forms authorizing the operation. However, not all of
these forms contained the patient's acknowledgment that the success of
the operation was not guaranteed and that he or she understood the
possibility of natural reversal.73 The ease with which such a disclaimer
could be included in the consent form and its value in the event of
litigation, would seem to make its inclusion most advantageous. However,
to prevent a finding that the patient did not understand the disclaimer,
the use of technical terms such as "recanalization," which might not be
readily understood by the layman, should be avoided.74
68 See p. 417 supra.
6 9 There have been improvements in technique, such as tying one or both ends
of the severed tube back upon themselves, which have probably done much to reduce
the probability of recanalization. However, physicians are not yet able to guarantee
permanent sterility.
70 391 P2d 201 (Wash. 1964).
711d. at 203-04.
72 Any evidence on this issue will normally be within the sole knowledge of the
plaintiff and the impregnated woman. Moreover, if the woman is plaintiff's wife,
the court may be unreceptive to the allegation of adultery. Such a finding would
not only establish immoral conduct on the part of the wife, but would incidentally
establish the illegitimacy of the child.
73 The field research revealed a wide variation in the content of the consent forms.
They ranged from a one-sentence request for the operation to a full exposition of
request, acknowledgment of explanation and understanding, and disclaimer of lia-
bility.
74 Some consent forms contained disclaimer clauses couched in language of such
breadth as to be a waiver of any and all liability of the physician arising from the
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Although plaintiffs may be able to establish an express warranty of
permanent sterility, the cases suggest a reluctance by the courts to permit
the recovery of damages. In the reported cases the plaintiffs sought to
recover either the expenses incident to the birth of a child or the anticipated
expense of rearing it, or both. In Shaheen the court held that "to allow
damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal
public sentiment of the people." 75 A similar public-policy argument was
employed in Ball v. Mudge, where the court held that the jury could
reasonably have found that the plaintiff's expenses were "far outweighed by
the blessing of a cherished child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of
conception and birth." 76 The court in Christensen did not rely on public
policy in stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the costs of
the child's birth. Instead, it found that the purpose of the operation was
to save the wife from the hazards of childbirth and that the expenses of
her pregnancy were not within the contemplation of the parties.
77
According to basic contract principles the court's analysis in Christen-
sen is correct, and it would not seem to preclude recovery for the expenses
claimed if the plaintiff had expressed a different purpose in requesting the
operation. However, the finding of public policy in Shaheen would leave
plaintiffs without redress when they incur the very expenses which they
contracted to avoid. The rationale of the court, that "the paramount
purposes of the marriage [are] the procreation and protection of legitimate
children," 78 would seem logically to compel a holding that a sterilization
contract to defeat these purposes would be completely unenforceable-a
result which the court specifically rejected. If the contract is held to be
enforceable, the courts should at least award damages for the costs of the
delivery of the child, or else a promise of a successful operation would
be read out of the contract.
The expense of rearing and educating a child poses a more complex
problem because there is general recognition of the intangible rewards of
parenthood. The difficulty with using the benefits of parenthood to offset
financial costs is the failure to recognize that, for the segment of the
community which resorts to sterilization, the values of having a child do
not outweigh financial or other considerations.7 9 The Shaheen court's
operation, including that for negligent performance. Such sweeping disclaimers
should be avoided because of the possibility that a court would find it unreasonable
that a patient would knowingly waive all claims for negligence and strike down
the entire clause-leaving the physician open to a claim of warranty of permanence.
75 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
76 391 P.2d 201, 204 (Wash. 1964).
77 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934).
78 11 Pa. D. & C2d at 45.
79 Moreover, the fact that the parents love the child and feel responsible for its
welfare once it has been born does not mean that they would not have been generally
happier without it or that its birth constitutes a "blessed event" in every way. An
inability to provide for and educate their previously born children as they had antici-
pated or to maintain a higher standard of living once contemplated may be a con-
stant source of sorrow for which the joy derived from the newest child compensates
only inadequately.
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answer to this contention would appear to be that the parents could put
the child up for adoption 80 However, the suggestion that a couple would
be willing to do this ignores the possibility that the parents may feel a
responsibility to keep an unwanted child once it is born. Moreover, if the
injured parties to the contract were able to avoid these additional expenses
only in this way, it would have the undesirable result of encouraging the
separation of children from their natural parents.
3. Negligence
Although sterilization operations are less intricate than many other
surgical procedures, a physician may still be liable in a malpractice action
for damages resulting from his negligence. Moreover, even if a plaintiff's
consent would be held to bar an action based upon the illegality of the
operation, there would be no reason to hold that the plaintiff had consented
to the physician's negligence.8 '
Since natural reversal of the operation is more common in male
sterilization, an unsuccessful female sterilization would more likely have
been caused by the doctor's negligence. Should physicians and hospitals
begin to require that the consent forms contain adequate disclaimers of
any guarantee of permanence, the only theory upon which a civil action
might be founded would be negligence. But in these cases the possibility
of recanalization operates in the doctor's favor, because it would prevent
the plaintiff from employing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
8 2
The continuing presence of sperm in the ejaculate for a period follow-
ing the operation upon the male,83 as well as the possibility of recanalization,
presents an opportunity for an allegation of postoperative negligence. In
Ball v. Mudge,8 4 the plaintiff contended that the physician had been
negligent in not performing postoperative tests to determine whether he
was producing sperm on the ground that such tests were required by the
standard of medical practice in the community. Expert testimony showed
that because vasectomies were commonly performed in the physician's
office rather than in a hospital, there was no standard of practice in the
matter.8 5 On this evidence the supreme court upheld the jury's verdict
for the defendant physician. Although a doctor cannot compel the patient
to return for periodic sperm tests after the operation, courts may find in
other cases that the standard of practice in the community requires that he
at least make the patient aware of the advisability that such tests be
so See id. at 46.
81 See note 52 supra.
82 The fact that the operation may not result in permanent sterility even though
skillfully performed would mean that one of the prerequisites for the application of
the doctrine was not met-the result would not be one which does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence. See generally PRoSsER, ToRTs §§ 42-43, at 199-217
(2d ed. 1955).
83 See p. 416 supra.
84 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964).
85 391 P.2d at 203.
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procured. 80 For this reason it would be desirable that the consent form
contain an acknowledgment of such an awareness.
4. Actions by a Nonconsenting Spouse
Physicians and hospitals uniformly require the consent of the patient's
spouse to the performance of sterilization operations. The reason given
for this requirement was a fear of liability to the spouse if his or her con-
sent is not obtained. In this context liability would have to be based either
upon a tortious injury to the patient resulting in a loss of consortium 
8 7
or a tortious interference with the marital relationship of the patient and
the nonconsenting spouse.88 The first theory would not support a cause
of action for a nonnegligent operation to which the patient lawfully con-
sented because the consent would render it nontortious.89 The second
theory, however, does not require a personal injury to the patient, but
rather an injury to the nonconsenting spouse himself. The action for
tortious interference with marital rights has generally been based upon
conduct within the broad classification of "alienation of affection." 90
However, this cause of action has heretofore been limited to cases in
which the conduct is intended or has a natural tendency to undermine
the affection which the spouse to whom the defendant's acts are directed
has for the plaintiff.91 Although a patient's request for sterilization
without the agreement of his spouse may reflect an already existing loss of
affection,9 2 there is no reason to believe that the operation itself would
produce such a result. Therefore, if a nonconsenting spouse is to recover
for alienation of affection, the theory would have to be extended to include
conduct which tends to undermine the affection of the plaintiff for his
sterilized spouse.
However, the courts may be reluctant to recognize this type of injury
because of the unreliability of the evidence that could be used to prove the
plaintiff's assertion that the operation substantially affected his love for
his spouse and the overwhelming difficulty that the defendant would have
in refuting this claim. In order to hold the physician liable for the injury,
the courts would also have to find that a loss of affection on the part of
8GThe physicians interviewed who performed vasectomies in any appreciable
number were in agreement as to the advisability of postoperative tests.
The danger arising from the continuing presence of sperm for a short period
following the operation might be avoided by advising either that the patient return
for postoperative tests or that he continue to use contraceptives for a sufficient time
for the sperm to disappear.
87 See generally PROssER, ToRTs § 119 (3d ed. 1964).
88 See generally id. § 118.
89 See note 47 mepra and accompanying text.
90 See PROSsER, ToRTs § 118, at 898 (3d ed. 1964). See generally Brown, The
Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472 (1934).
91 See PRossa, ToRTs § 118, at 898 (3d ed. 1964).
92 See p. 418 uP ra.
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the nonconsenting spouse was a natural effect of the operation. This
decision would necessitate a complex inquiry into what would constitute
a reasonable reaction by the plaintiff and what effects could be reasonably
foreseen by the doctor-an analysis that the courts may be reluctant to
undertake. However, although the doctor may have no legal duty to obtain
a spouse's consent, his professional duty to act only in the best interest of
his patient would seem to require this procedure.
Unilateral elective sterilization may give rise to an action for annul-
ment or divorce by an unconsulted or dissenting spouse. In a majority of
jurisdictions, sterility, where there remains capacity for natural intercourse,
has generally been held an insufficient ground for divorce or annulment.9 3
However, one court has found that a refusal of "natural uncontracepted"
intercourse constitutes "constructive desertion" on the ground that the
primary purpose of marriage is procreationK 4-- a rationale which would
be equally applicable to unilateral sterilization.
A generally recognized ground for annulment of a marriage is that of
fraud in the contract, which has been defined as a fundamental misrepre-
sentation as to a basic premise underlying the marital relationship.9 5 In
this context the courts that have considered the question have not hesitated
to find that the procreation of children is such a basic premise. Where a
spouse, before marriage, professed a desire to establish a family, having
the intention at the time never to do so, the other party to the marriage
may secure an annulment upon discovering the contrary intention.9 6 On
the other hand, a change of mind after marriage, resulting in a refusal to
have children, will not entitle the other party to an annulment,97 nor to a
divorce in most jurisdictions.98 Under this reasoning unilateral elective
93 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Gibbs, 156 Fla. 404, 23 So. 2d 382 (1945) ; Payne v. Payne,
46 Minn. 467, 49 N.W. 230 (1891); Smith v. Smith, 206 Mo. App. 646, 229 S.W.
398 (1921) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 216 Pa. Super. 423, 191 Atl. 666 (1930).
9 4 Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 NJ. Misc. 52, 23 A2d 800 (Ch. 1942).
Some courts have held that a total refusal by one spouse constitutes "construc-
tive" desertion if persisted in for the statutory period. See Evans v. Evans, 27 Ky. 1,
56 S.W.2d 547 (1938) ; Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312, 46 A2d 617 (1946) ; Rector v.
Rector, 78 N.J. Eq. 386, 79 Atl. 295 (Ch. 1911). However, the weight of authority
is to the contrary. See, e.g., McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 175, 10 A.2d 365
(1939); Hinkel v. Hinkel, 209 Ga. 554, 74 S.E2d 657 (1953); Lambert v. Lambert,
165 Iowa 367, 145 N.W. 920 (1914); Pollard v. Pollard, 98 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct
App. 1936); Taylor v. Taylor, 142 Pa. Super. 441, 16 A.2d 651 (1940).
95 See Yanoff v. Yanoff, 237 Mich. 383, 211 N.W. 735 (1927).
96 See Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252 (1940); Thurber
v. Thurber, 186 Misc. 1022, 63 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See also Maslow v.
Maslow, 117 Cal. App. 2d 237, 255 P2d 65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Pisciotta v.
Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 91 A.2d 629 (App. Div. 1952) (actions failed for insuffi-
ciency of proof).
The California courts have held that where one spouse was sterile at the time
of marriage and knowing this fact did not disclose it, the other party to the marriage
may secure an annulment upon discovery of the condition, whether or not there were
positive misrepresentations. Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App. 2d 794, 128 P.2d 376 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1942); Aufort v. Aufort, 9 Cal. App. 2d 310, 49 P.2d 620 (Dist. Ct App.
1935).
97 See Longtin v. Longtin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
98 See note 94 supra.
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sterilization, shortly after marriage and before the birth of any issue,
could constitute grounds for annulment if it could be shown that the
operation was procured pursuant to an intention formed prior to marriage.
Because of these possibilities, a consideration for the interests of the
patient would result in continuing the requirement that the spouse's consent
be obtained.
C. Statutory Authorization of Elective Sterilization
1. Virginia and North Carolina Voluntary Sterilization Statutes
Two states, Virginia in 1962 and North Carolina in 1963, have enacted
statutes expressly negating civil or criminal liability of physicians for
the nonnegligent performance of surgical sterilizations in accordance with
prescribed procedures. 99 Neither statute purports to restrict the purposes
for which the operation may be performed. To come within the protection
of these statutes the doctor must perform the operation pursuant to the
written request of the patient and, if married, of his or her spouse, in a
licensed hospital, after giving the patient a full and reasonable medical
explanation of its nature and consequences. He must obtain the concur-
rence of at least one consulting physician and may not operate until thirty
days after the request. Although these statutes would seem to preclude
any action based upon the illegality of a properly documented operation,
they do not automatically insure that the physician will not incur civil
liability just because the operation is not negligently performed. He must
continue to protect himself against the claim of a warranty of permanent
sterility. 00 Another source of uncertainty is the failure of the statutes to
specify where the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a spouse shall
lie. The statutory requirement of the consent of both spouses may lend
support to a claim that sterilization of the patient without such consent
was an actionable wrong as to the nonconsenting spouse. However, in
the absence of circumstances which would reasonably place the doctor on
notice to the contrary, it would seem that he would be found justified in
relying upon the patient's representation that he or she was unmarried.
Each physician interviewed during the field research was asked his
opinion on various provisions of the Virginia and North Carolina statutes,
as well as the probable effect of a similar statute upon sterilization practice
in Pennsylvania. The reactions of obstetricians and gynecologists were
generally favorable; the primary objection expressed was directed at the
requirement of a thirty-day waiting period. Some physicians pointed out
that most salpingectomies are performed post partum, and that the decision
to undergo the operation often is not made until late in pregnancy. If the
operation could not be performed at delivery because the waiting period
99 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -275 (Supp. 1963) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-423
to -426 (Supp. 1962).
100 See text accompanying notes 66-69 mipra.
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had not elapsed, the expense and inconvenience of another hospitalization
would be necessary and the optimum physical conditions produced by
pregnancy would be lost. If the delivery were by caesarean section, post-
ponement would mean an additional and otherwise unnecessary abdominal
incision. However, a waiting period to insure against unconsidered deci-
sions would seem appropriate even in cases of female sterilization because
of the emotional stress incident to awaiting the birth of a child. Any
undesirable effect this restriction might have upon the performance of
the operation could be cured by the obstetrician's informing the couple
during the early months of pregnancy of the availability of a post partum
sterilization. 10 1 -Some urologists interviewed expressed dissatisfaction
with the statutes' requirement that the operation be performed in a hospital.
Since vasectomy may be performed as an office procedure,10 2 they felt that
hospitalization would only add expense and inconvenience for the patient
and place the doctor under the substantive restrictions imposed by his
hospital.
Both urologists, obstetricians, and gynecologists objected to the require-
ment of consultation in nontherapeutic cases. Since the physician is not
required to exercise any medical judgment in such cases,10 3 any limitations
upon the availability of the operation will be those imposed by the hospital
or by the individual doctor based upon their own interests and social
values and an estimation of what is in the patient's best interest. More-
over, it was thought that the requirement would not serve as an effective
incentive to self-regulation by the medical profession, since the statutes'
expression of public policy sanctioning the operation would insure that
two physicians who agreed on any particular case could easily be found.
Therefore, this requirement also was seen as merely adding unnecessarily
to the expense of the operation.
When asked about the probable effect of a Pennsylvania statute similar
to those passed in Virginia and North Carolina, the doctors interviewed
expressed differing opinions. About half of the doctors thought that a
statute would liberalize present standards, especially in those hospitals
that permit sterilization only for therapeutic reasons or require an ex-
tremely large number of children. They said that the enactment of such
a statute would have a liberalizing effect partially because of the removal
of any legal inhibitions a doctor might feel and most importantly because
of the evidence of public policy condoning the procedure.
On the other hand, the doctors who felt that a statute would not
influence the existing practice suggested that the reason why sterilization
had been restricted was not the fear of incurring legal liability or an
uncertainty about public policy. In their own practice they were more
101 Since the request or consent may be withdrawn at any time prior to the
operation, the couple could enter their request before making a final decision.
102 See p. 416 supra.
103 See pp. 420-21 supra.
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concerned with the irreparable nature of the operation and the militant
opposition of religious groups. In view of these factors and the availability
of other contraceptive means and the possibility of mortality in female
sterilization, they would continue to impose the same restrictive policy,
regardless of the passage of such a statute.
Although there was disagreement as to the probable effect of the
statute, most doctors were in favor of its enactment. They said that they
would feel much safer in performing whatever sterilizations they felt
proper. Many mentioned their concern with the recent upsurge of mal-
practice suits and their concomitant desire for as much protection as
possible.
A few doctors expressed some concern that if such a statute were
passed, sterilization would become too readily available, and that some
unscrupulous doctors might encourage the operation for the purpose of
their own financial gain. This result is highly improbable. As evidenced
by the present restraint and internal regulation of sterilization, the medical
profession generally sets very high ethical standards for itself and is
usually quite conservative. Since the possibility of legal consequences is
only one of several inhibiting factors, it is doubtful that the passage of a
statute, such as was passed in Virginia and North Carolina, would result
in the wholesale availability of sterilizations or the misuse of the statutory
immunity by the medical profession.
2. A Proposed Statute
A statute imposing a minimum of rational restrictions would enable
the medical profession to develop standards of reasonable practice. On
the other hand, premature consideration by the legislature, before the
medical profession and the general community have reached a consensus
of opinion on the subject, could produce a statute imposing restrictions
on sterilization which may later prove overly stringent. And experi-
ence has shown that it is extremely difficult to obtain the repeal or
amendment of an outdated statute, especially when it deals with a subject
having a moral or religious overtone for some segments of the com-
munity.1° 4 For these reasons, even a proponent of a liberalized sterilization
procedure has not advocated legislative action at this time. 10 5 In its view
the possibility of adverse legal consequences are so slight, even in the
absence of meaningful authority, that education of the profession and the
community and a case-by-case development of the law would be most
desirable.
However, many doctors have been deterred from performing elective
sterilizations because of the fear that the unsettled state of the law may
encourage patients and pressure groups to involve them in legal contro-
104 See Bickel, supra note 56, at 61-64.
105 Human Betterment Ass'n of America, Inc., The Lawyer Speaks on Sterili-
zation, 1964 (Statement by Harriet F. Pilpel, HBAA Legal Counsel).
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versy. The action of the Virginia and North Carolina legislatures may
cause other states to meet this problem by comprehensive statutes. How-
ever, the information derived from the field research interviews suggests
that several changes in the already existing designs would be necessary
to formulate an optimum statute. The following proposal reflects the
basic practical and policy considerations revealed by the legal and field
research.
PROPOSED VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION ACT
§ 1. Sterilization operation upon person twenty-one years of age
or older.-It shall be lawful for any physician or surgeon licensed
by this State, when so requested by any person twenty-one years
of age or over, to perform upon such person a surgical interrup-
tion of vas deferens or fallopian tubes provided a request in writing
is made by such person at least thirty (30) days prior to the per-
formance of such surgical operation; and provided, further, that
prior to or at the time of such request a full and reasonable medical
explanation is given by such physician or surgeon to such person
as to the nature and consequences of such operation; and provided,
further, that a request in writing is also made at least thirty (30)
days prior to the performance of the operation by the spouse of
such person, if there be one, unless the spouse has been declared
mentally incompetent, or unless a separation agreement has been
entered into between the spouse and the person to be operated
upon, or unless the spouse and the person to be operated upon
have been divorced from bed and board or have been divorced
absolutely.
§ 2. Sterilization operation upon person under twenty-one.-Any
such physician or surgeon may perform a surgical interruption of
vas deferens or fallopian tubes upon any person under the age of
twenty-one years when so requested in writing by such minor
and in accordance with the conditions and requirements set forth
in section 1 of this act, provided that the juvenile court of the
county wherein such minor resides, upon petition of the parent
or parents, if they be living, or the guardian or next friend of
such minor shall determine that the operation is in the best
interest of such minor and shall enter an order authorizing the
physician or surgeon to perform such operation.
§ 3. Thirty-day waiting period.--No operation shall be performed
pursuant to the provisions of this act prior to thirty (30) days from
the date of consent or request therefor, or in the case of a minor,
from the date of the order of the court authorizing the same, and
in neither event if the consent for such operation is withdrawn
prior to its commencement.
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§ 4. No liability for nonnegligent performance of operation.-
Subject to the rules of law applicable generally to negligence, no
physician or surgeon licensed by this State shall be liable either
civilly or criminally by reason of having performed a surgical
interruption of vas deferens or fallopian tubes authorized by the
provisions of this act upon any person in this State.
§ 5. Prohibition of sterilization operations not performed in ac-
cordance with this act.-Any person who shall perform a surgical
interruption of vas deferens or fallopian tubes upon any person in
this State, except as authorized by this act [or by a eugenic sterili-
zation statute] shall be guilty of:
(a) a misdemeanor where the person performing the opera-
tion believes that the person upon whom such operation is per-
formed consents to its performance;
(b) a felony where the person performing the operation does
not believe that the person upon whom such operation is per-
formed consents to its performance.
§ 6. Therapeutic and eugenic sterilizations excepted.-Nothing
in this act shall restrict the performance of a surgical interruption
of vas deferens or fallopian tubes for sound therapeutic reasons
[or affect the provisions of a state eugenic sterilization statute].
Pursuant to the suggestions of the doctors interviewed, the proposed
statute does not contain provisions, such as the requirement of consultation,
which serve no valid purpose in cases of elective sterilization. Other
principal innovations of the suggested statute are the provisions for criminal
liability for failure to conform to the prescribed procedures and for the
waiver of the required procedures in cases of therapeutic indications for
the operation.
It has been argued previously that the clauses in eugenic sterilization
statutes which waive the procedural requirements in cases of a medical
indication should not be construed to preclude lawful sterilizations for
other than therapeutic purposes. This argument was based upon the
rationale that it would be unwarranted to conclude that the legislature had
considered and disposed of the controversial subject of elective sterilization
in the context of a eugenic statute. However, a statute such as the one
presently proposed would demand full consideration of the entire problem.
In this context a legislature should properly devise procedures for elective
sterilization which are intended to be exclusive, and they should express
this purpose in the statute so that the courts are not faced with the
dilemma of searching for their intent or the force of public policy whenever
the procedures are not followed.
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The insertion of a provision which relieves a physician of the statutory
requirements in situations where there is a medical reason for the operation
may be overly cautious. It is unlikely that a court would hold a doctor
criminally liable for performing the operation immediately upon the dis-
covery of a serious physical disorder. However, the absence of such an
exemption in the statute may have the undesirable effect of deterring
doctors from performing needed therapeutic surgery because of their
uncertainty as to how the statute would be interpreted by the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The restrictions which the medical profession has imposed upon
elective sterilization seriously limit the individual's choice. Wherever
these restrictions have been caused by a fear of legal liability, the analysis
in this Note and perhaps the enactment of the proposed statute should
cause a reevaluation of the doctors' policy toward sterilization. In other
cases the restrictions have been justified by the doctors' desire to protect
the patient from future unhappiness or to avoid public controversy which
would be damaging to their professional standing. No attempt has been
made to assess the validity of the latter reasons when balanced against the
individual's right to employ this means of family limitation. However,
the fact that important social and economic considerations may motivate
the individual choice for sterilization would indicate that doctors should
at least hesitate before imposing their own values upon their decisions as
to what would be in the best interest of their patients.
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